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This paper analyses the prospects and problems of a Transatlantic Free Trade Area
(TAFTA) between the European Union and the United States. Possible economic
reasons for the proposal of TAFFA such as the intensity of bilateral trade and a strong
interdependence in investment flows and the similarity of the EU and the US in their
factor endowment and tariff structure are examined.
There are cases shining favourably on the idea, but the implementation of TAFTA will
imply substantial costs due to the internal and external consequences. The main
problem of a free trade area between the two most important economic blocs is the
impact on the multilateral approach of trade liberalisation.
The authors suggest a Transatlantic Liberalisation Initiative (TALI) as an alternative to
TAFTA. Under TALI, the EU and the US should accelerate their implementation of
their Uruguay Round commitments and liberalise in areas that are not yet covered by
WTO agreements. This should be done under the Most-Favoured Nation clause and
would be a strong motivating force for multilateral liberalisation. In addition, TALI
could be a forerunner in reducing market segmentation and in establishing a semi-
internal market between Europe and America.
JEL Classification: F15
Keywords: Transatlantic Free Trade Area; regional integration;
European Union; United States; multilateral liberalisationI. The Issue*
There are quite a few already existing or projected Free Trade Areas around these
days: EFTA in Europe which except for Switzerland has been absorbed by the
European Union or the European Economic Area, the new Central European Free
Trade Area (CEFTA) of the post-communist countries, the Asean Free Trade
Area (AFTA), NAFTA in North America and Mercosur in the South.
Furthermore proposals are discussed about the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). So after EFTA,
CEFTA, AFTA and NAFTA - do we also need the TAFTA - the Transatlantic
Free Trade Area?
From a political perspective, TAFTA can serve as the driving force for a
revitalised political transatlantic relationship. Economists may call it an
international collective good lowering transaction costs from the political side.
There exists the fear of the creeping erosion of the special transatlantic
relationship after the demise of the common threat. Europeans have claimed to
perceive either a "Pacific tilt" in American foreign policy or a neo-isolationism
[Financial Times, 1995], For some Americans, the projects of Eastern
enlargement of the European Union and monetary union in Europe have led the
Europeans to become more Eurocentric. The shared belief in democracy, human
rights and the market economy has been and is the foundation of the strong
transatlantic relationship [Commission of the European Communities, 1995].
Prominent politicians have argued that the future of this special relationship
would require a framework of agreements. An agreement on a free trade area is
seen as a good point of departure.
From an economist's point of view, the core question is whether regionalism
constitutes a threat to the multilateral trading system. An answer to this question
is of paramount importance when assessing the likely effects of a Transatlantic
Free Trade Area (TAFTA) not only from a single country point of view but from
world welfare viewpoint. A recent WTO study analysing the effects of more than
100 regional trade agreements since World War II has negated this question'
[WTO, 1995a]. It concludes that regional integration and the multilateral trading
system have been complements rather than alternatives in the pursuit of open
trade. Even more, the co-existence between the two has been found to be at least
satisfactory if not broadly positive [ibid].
* This paper is based on a lecture given by Horn Siebert at the American Institute for Contemporary German
Studies at the Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC, on December 14,1995.To qualify this conclusion, it is important to recall that post-war regional
integration has been based on two main pillars:
• the continuous process of integration with deepening and widening in Western
Europe;
• the "hub-and-spoke" agreements between the EU and the US on the one hand
and developing and transformation countries on the other hand. The EU has
concluded bilateral agreements with many Mediterranean and African
countries to support efforts of expansion in these countries. Preferences were
granted without requesting reciprocity. Furthermore, the EU has recently
signed Association Agreements with most Central European transformation
countries. Similarly, the US has bilateral agreements with countries of Latin
American and the Caribbean and a plurilateral treaty with Canada and Mexico
on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
A third avenue of regional integration is characterised by its failure: almost all
trade agreements among developing countries were caught in distributional
conflicts and moved into disintegration or stagnation at best [Langhammer, 1992].
These three pillars did not comprise bilateral "mega" agreements between the Big
3 of World Trade - EU, US, Japan. Liberalisation of trade between these three
occurred on the multilateral level. This has changed with the emergence of the
Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). The ambitious goal of APEC is a
free trade area around the Pacific by the year 2010 for the developed countries -
i.e. including the US and Japan - and by the year 2020 for all member countries.
The chances for meeting the timetable of this target are mixed. APEC is a mini-
WTO including similar challenges rooted in huge income and growth disparities,
political rivalry, cultural differences and historical legacies.
The other idea of the regional integration among the Big 3 also involves the US,
excludes Japan and includes the EU. This is TAFTA. Both approaches of regional
integration involving the US plus the afore mentioned European integration and
the "hub-and-spoke" arrangements run parallel to the planned implementation of
the results of the Uruguay Round.
This parallelism opens up questions: Is TAFTA a threat to the WTO-approach of
multilateralism or a supplementary approach? Can TAFTA open up a route to
universal free trade that is not yet available through the WTO? Can TAFTA
accelerate global liberalisation? If a cost-benefit analysis comes to the conclusionthat TAFTA is not the right approach to liberalise, could the willingness to
liberalisation - as expressed in promoting TAFTA - be integrated in the
multilateral context?
The paper will discuss economic cases for and against TAFTA, analyse the
alternatives to TAFTA and conclude by arguing in favour of a multilateral
approach of liberalisation between the US and the EU.
II. Possible Cases for TAFTA
1. Strong Trade Relationship
The customs union theory supplies a rule of thumb to assess free trade
arrangements among countries:
The welfare-enhancing effect of efficiency gains inside the union (often referred
to as a result of trade creation) is expected to exceed welfare-decreasing
discrimination outside the union (referred to as trade diversion)
• the larger the initial share of the member countries in worldtrade
• and the larger the initial share of intra-regional trade in the total trade of the
member countries.
These two criteria can be applied to TAFTA.
The EU and the US are the leading individual players of world trade closely
followed by Japan. However, this ranking does not indicate a dominant position
in world trade. In 1993, together they accounted for 34 per cent of world total
exports (including commodities) and 38 per cent of world'manufactured exports
(Table 1). Hence, more than 60 per cent of world trade cannot be attributed to
them but to trading partners in Asia and other countries of the Western
hemisphere. Whether TAFTA meets the first criterion is particularly questionable
due to the observation that the trend since 1980 has been declining. This is most
visible in manufactured exports where trade policies are especially relevant


































Source: Calculated from UN, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, current issues.
As concerns the second criterion, the magnitude of intra-area trade, similar
conclusions can be drawn as to the first one (Table 2). Both the US and the EU
largely trade with other countries and again the trend in intra-"TAFTA"-trade is
declining, especially in manufactures.
Merging the two criteria yields that in 1993 only about 7 per cent of world
manufactured exports was due to US exports to the EU and EU exports to the
US (after 8 per cent in 1980). While this may signal a still untapped potential for
additional trade between the two areas it mainly suggests that the discrimination
effect of bilateral trade liberalisation to the detriment of third countries must not
be underrated. For both partners, the current volume of trade outside TAFTA
exceeds intra-area trade by far.




















































Source: See Table I.2. Strong Investment Relationship
A main characteristic of the EU-US economic relations is the extensive flow of
foreign direct investment in both directions. The EU as well as the US are for
one another the most important hosts for investment activity partly because the
Japanese market is largely closed for FDI. By end-1994, about 41 per cent of the
US FDI stock was located in the EU-15 (Graph 1). Until 1993, the US had more
direct investment in the UK than in all countries of the Asia-Pacific area. It was
not earlier than 1994 that the latter area bypassed the UK as a host.
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Source: US Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, various issues.Graph 1 shows the importance of the EU as a host for US FDI stock in three
sectors since 1980. It demonstrates in all industries (including the oil sector) and
in the strongly liberalised EU service sector that this share followed a rising
trend while in the traditional forerunning sector, manufacturing, shares
fluctuated in the range of 42-51 per cent.
The other direction of investment flows is likewise substantial. During the late
eighties, EU investors had more than 40 per cent of their total extra-EU flows in
the US (and Canada). Yet, the trend was declining (down from 60-70 per cent in
the eighties) following the renewed attractiveness of developing countries in
Asia and Latin America.
The graphs of the share of the US in FDI of four EU countries show the eminent
position of the US as a destination of European investment at the late eighties
(see Graph 2). Since then the attraction of the US for European FDI has fallen
rapidly while hosts within the EU became much more attractive.
Taking all these figures together, the distinguishing characteristic of the EU and
US economic relations is the mutual inter-linkage through FDI. Both regions
have considerable ownership interests in the other region's market and are
therefore strongly inclined to maintain well functioning transatlantic ties. As a
result, trade relations in recent history have been generally harmonious. Without
doubt, trade disputes have arisen due to certain sectors, which are high on the
agenda for further liberalisation and which will be addressed below. However,
the number of bilateral disputes has been small compared to overall trade and
has left the transatlantic relationship intact and co-operative. This has been
explicitly confirmed by the latest US Trade Representative Report on Trade
Barriers [USTR, 1994].
3. Similarity of Factor Endowment
The EU and the US are similar in their income stage, their levels of technology
and in the availability of capital and skilled labour. When two regions are similar
in their capital-labour ratios, then there will be little inter-industry trade, and
intra-industry trade based on imperfect competition will be dominant. Intra-
industry trade is based on economies of scale as well as variety of preferences
on the demand side and allows countries to benefit from larger markets and to
consume a greater variety of goods. Under such conditions, the traditional trade
creation and trade diversion debate based on perfect competition loses much ofGraph 2 - Share














. V ..• . . . United
\ ' Kingdom
\\ / • ••
^; - -'_ .,. Netherlands
\ / ' France
Germany
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
a Three years moving average ...
Source: OECD, International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
its relevance. Intra-industry trade accounts for one-fourth of world trade and is
especially important for the trade in manufactures between EU and the US.
What makes a high share of intra-industry trade an asset in the context of
TAFTA is that it is much less vulnerable to protectionism than inter-industry
trade. Political opposition against liberalisation is diffused if freeing trade leads
to expansion of both exports and imports in the same sector. Lay-offs of labour
and capital in individual industries due to tough import competition can be
avoided if liberalisation promises to stimulate own exports from this sector, too.Liberalisation is furthermore facilitated if the degree of openness between the
members of a free trade arrangement is similar. This is the case with the US and
EU in which external imports contribute to total domestic supply to a similar
extent. In manufactures, the US (plus Canada) had a so-called import market
penetration ratio (imports as a percentage of total domestic supply) of 11.8 per
cent in 1990/91 (latest year available) compared to 13.2 per cent in the EU.
However, there are a notable differences between the ratios in individual
industries, suggesting different sectoral levels of protection in the US and the
EU (Appendix Table). As a striking example, the EU is much less open to
imports in the highly protected clothing industry (29 per cent) than the US (42
per cent). Such differences could lead to industry-specific resistance in bilateral
trade liberalisation.
4. Low Tariffs Against Third Countries
Both the EU and the US have low average industrial tariffs. Before the Uruguay
Round the weighted average tariff for industrial goods amounted to 5.7 per cent
for the EU and 5.4 per cent for the US. After the implementation of the Uruguay
Round decisions the weighted average tariff for industrial goods will be 3.6 per
cent for the EU and 3.5 per cent for the US [GATT: 69].
Thus, to cut the remaining tariffs completely, should neither result in major
revenue losses nor be strongly opposed by affected industries. The former is
relevant in the US because under US law such losses have to be compensated
for by other revenues.
However, there are still some sensitive sectors with high levels of protection, for
instance, agriculture. Even after the full implementation of the Uruguay Round
the estimates of the unweighted average tariff equivalents of agricultural
protection are 30 per cent for the US and 75 per cent for the EU [Ingco, Reincke,
1995, cited in Schott, 1995]. The average US tariffs on apparel items will still be
about 17.5 per cent after the implementation of the Uruguay Round and the EU
tariffs about 12 per cent.
It is obvious that the dismantling of tariffs in bilateral trade parallel to the
implementation of the Uruguay Round implies small preference margins
compared to Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment. Static trade effects would
be small, too. Schott [1995: 6] estimates that the total elimination of tariffs on
bilateral trade would increase US exports to the EU by about 10.8 per cent andEU exports to the US by 6.3 per cent. This would be equivalent to an increase of
total US trade of only 2.3 per cent (1993 figures) or 0.2 per cent of US GDP. For
the EU, such static effects would be even lower (1.1 per cent and 0.1 per cent).
Even if one takes into consideration that neither non-tariff barriers nor dynamic
effects are taken into account, it is suggestive to argue that intra-'TAFTA" tariff
liberalisation confined to merchandise trade is unlikely to have a strong effect on
national income of the two trading partners.
III. The Costs of TAFTA
As has been shown above, there are some arguments that shine favourably on
the idea of TAFTA. Benefits, however, have to be confronted with costs both for
the partners as well as for the rest of the world. Do benefits compensate enough
for such costs. What are the costs of TAFFA?
In fact, TAFTA would have far reaching internal and external consequences.
1. The Internal Dimension of TAFTA
First, there are internal adjustment problems especially in hitherto protected
industries and sectors due to the requirements of the WTO rules. The WTO is
stricter than GATT in its tolerance of free trade agreements and in its advocacy
of the interests of the non-members. The GATT Article XXIV was written to
allow only exceptions to multilateral liberalisation in the case of full integration
of trade. Yet, in the past, the intention of the Article XXIV was not kept up in
reality. The ambiguity of this article and political pressure led to a large number
of free trade areas among GATT members that do not fulfil the requirements of
the GATT framework, namely the 100 per cent liberalisation in "substantially"
all sectors [Bhagwati, 1991]. The WTO has learnt from this permissive practice.
Reform proposals advocate that in the future a free trade area would comprise al]
sectors including agriculture. Disadvantages of the non-members due to the free
trade area have to be compensated. If these proposals become reality, there are
two possibilities for countries seeking mutual preferential treatment:
• a]] (and not only "substantially all" as in the GATT article XXIV) sectors will
be subject to free trade. t10
• Alternatively, the MFN principle holds. The countries would have to extend,
their mutual reductions in tariffs to all WTO members.
This alternative would mean that there is no "exclusive" TAFTA. Under the first
option, all of the outstanding issues in trade relations between the EU and the
US would have to be solved. There are quite a few sensible sectors requiring
considerable adjustment; first and foremost: Agriculture. The US Trade
Representative claims in his "1994 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign
Trade Barriers" that the elimination of the entire EU agricultural support system
including the variable levies, price supports and export subsidies would increase
US exports to all EU markets between $4 billion and $5 billion while decreasing
US imports about $2 billion [USTR, 1994: 73].
As mentioned before, tariff equivalents are still very high on agricultural
products. The arduous negotiations during the Uruguay Round were
characterised by many disputes over agriculture. The US and the EU were the
initiating and pushing forces of the Round, but these two countries were also
responsible for the long dead lock over agriculture until the Blair House
breakthrough in 1992. The agreement of the Uruguay Round represents a
significant milestone for the liberalisation of the global economy, but has still
left protectionism for agricultural products on a high level. It is highly unlikely
that vested interest groups within the EU and the US that were able to bloc far-
reaching liberalisation within agriculture could be overcome with a bilateral
agreement between the EU and the US.
Agriculture is the one issue that has the most potential to bring trade
negotiations on TAFTA to an early and prolonged halt. One reason for this
circumstance is that the EU is plagued by the Common Agricultural Policy and
its necessary reforms due to the forthcoming Eastern enlargement. Yet, the EU
still refuses to reduce subsidies substantially and to shift subsidisation to the
national level.
Other delicate sectors facing contentious negotiations comprise steel, textiles,
services, aviation and the defence industry.
To get the flavour of other outstanding issues here are some of the complaints of
the US trade representative about the EU trade barriers taken from the 1994
USTR Report:11
• The EU Motion Pictures Quotas and Broadcast Directive. The EU passed a
Broadcast Directive that requires that a majority of broadcast emissiqn.be
reserved for European origin programs.
• Government procurement that discriminates against non-EU bids.
• Lack of intellectual property protection.
• Investment barriers.
• Barriers to the Telecommunications market.
• Government support for the Airbus Industry.
On the other side, the EU Commission is reported to have complained about a
number of trade impediments, too [Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 1995].
• "Buy-American" requirements of government procurement:
• The unitary tax of some US states that leads to tax demands against European
firms based on their world wide turn over.
• Entry barriers to the US banking market.
• Problems of European exporters with the US customs authorities.
While these issues are promising areas of liberalisation between the EU and the
US, they were so often the center of dispute between the EU and the US during
the Uruguay Round that bilateral liberalisation without shifting the burden of
adjustment to third parties is unlikely to be within close reach. The multilateral
trading order failed to come to solutions in these fields due to the transatlantic
controversies. Would a bilateral attempt now be more successful? Given the
political situation in the US and the EU, this is unlikely in the near future. Trade
diplomats believe that only after 1997 the idea of a TAFTA could be considered
seriously. Before that date all political resources would be absorbed by the
presidential election in the US and the 1996 post-Maastricht governmental
conference in the EU. Consequently, the US President and the President of the
EU Commission postponed the signing of a formal agreement about trade
liberalisation at the Madrid meeting in December 1995. They decided to
commission a study how to reduce the trade barriers and how to promote the
economic links.
In addition to the issues mentioned above, there is ample scope for co-operation
in areas such as product testing, standardisation, international crime, the
environment and drugs trafficking.12
Furthermore, an internal US legal requirement might reduce the attraction of
TAFTA for the US government. The US has the "pay-as-you-go" budget rule
dictating that tariff revenues foregone have to be compensated by reduced
spending or increased taxes. Jeffrey Schott estimates the foregone US tariff
revenues at a total of US $ 7.3 billion assuming-that TAFTA was implemented
over five years [Schott, 1995]. Given the present zeal for budget stringency, the
perspective of losing this amount will strain support for TAFTA.
2. The External Dimension of TAFTA
a. Discrimination of third countries
The discrimination issue is of critical importance when assessing the compliance
of TAFTA with the WTO requirements. Third countries competing with TAFTA
suppliers under perfect competition will carefully observe whether their exports
to either the US or EU are diverted as a result of intra-TAFFA trade
liberalisation. Trade diversion occurs when a member country replaces tariff-
ridden imports from the rest of the world, which were the low-cost source in the
absence of preference agreements, with imports from the higher-cost partner
country. Trade diversion is welfare reducing.
As in the case of the trade creating effect, the overall trade diversion effect of
TAFTA,;is expected to be small due to the existing low level of weighted
average tariff;: However, the temptation might arise to use TAFTA as a weapon
against the Asian New Industrialising Economies and especially against Japan.
North America and Europe have constituencies that fear Asian productivity as
the main source of job killing. Increased global competition might tempt
political leaders to use TAFTA both as a protective shield and a leverage in
bargaining with other countries. They could be inclined to ignore that necessary
efficiency adjustments can be postponed, but not cost- and painless.
In collective bargaining, non-TAFTA countries could understand TAFTA as a
signal that the world's richest countries are more concerned in jointly
discriminate against the rest than in opening their markets to the developing
countries. There is the danger that TAFTA would be seen as a only slightly
modified form of the rich men club.13 Bibliofhek
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b. Free trade arrangements with third countries
The EU has a most complex and extensive system of preferential trading
agreement with other countries (Table 3). Similarly, the US has existing free
trade agreements with Canada and Mexico plus Canada apart from the "hub-and-
spoke" agreements with other countries of the Western hemisphere. In addition,
Table 3 - The Hierarchy of EU Trade Preferences, Early 1995
Trade Policy Regime
Free movement of goods, persons,
capital and services
Reciprocal free trade
Unilateral free access to the EU market
on a contractual basis
Autonomous preferences
Purely most favoured nations treatment
Mainly most favoured nations treatment




Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary,










(beneficiaries under the "Generalised
System of Preferences")
USA, Japan, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand
Successor republics of the Soviet Union
(except Baltic States)
Remaining state-trading economies
Source: WTO, Trade Policy Review - European Union (1995b). p. 19.14
the US is a member of APEC that aims to achieve free and open trade and
investment for a region that accounts for one half of the world economy. Would
the one partner allow that the products from these countries come in after the
detour through the other? Could products from Mexico arrive in the EU through
NAFTA barrier-free? Could products originating in Norway be exported without
tariff to the US when they these products came through the EU? This would
mean a de facto free trade area. Given the dense network of preferential
treatment of the two regions, the coverage of such a TAFTA would become
quite extensive. Why not global instead?
The alternative is a complex country of origin procedure in the EU and the US to
make sure that only products from the right partner country arrive tariff-free!
This customs procedure would be required to prevent trade deflection, i.e. the
situation in which each good enters through the TAFTA country with the lowest
tariff rate and is transshipped. To avoid trade deflection, one would need rules
stating what a specific fraction of a final good originates from the partner
country in order to be exempted from tariffs. With increasing globalisation of
production and markets, this will lead to fierce disputes. Unlike in a customs
union, rules of origin in a Free Trade Area could also be abused for protectionist
purposes [Krueger, 1995]. The EU pan offer a good example of a grotesque
dispute highlighting the difficulties a complex system of bilateral trade
arrangements will produce: in 1990 France claimed that the Nissan Bluebird,
which was produced in Britain, was a Japanese product and had to be included
under Japanese voluntary export restraint with France. According to French
beliefs, the Nissan Bluebird did not contain enough European value added to be
considered a European good to which free trade must be granted. The United
Kingdom maintained that all British-made goods have free access to any EU
market and a heated debate erupted over the local content requirements. Luckily
for the future of the European Union, the dispute ended with the assurance of
Nissan that the local content of its cars would soon be rising considerably.
c. Consequences for the multilateral trading process
TAFTA might accelerate the trend towards regional trade blocs and weaken the
multilateral approach of trade liberalisation. Yet, the WTO allows only a free
trade area covering all sectors. Otherwise any reductions in tariffs have to be
extended to all members of the WTO. Given historical experiences, it is very
likely that. TAFTA would not cover all sectors. This kind of TAFTA would not
fulfil the WTO requirements as an exclusive free trade area. A sectoral15
incomplete but regional limited free trade area would bent the WTO rules and
undermine the multilateral process.
Leaders from the US and the EU might run into problems when dealing with
other countries accused of protectionism and would have to face the question
from them: If the US and the EU seek free and open trade in world so much,
why have they created their own trading arrangements?
In theory, a Transatlantic Customs Union (TACU) might be consistent with the
WTO. Krueger [19951 has shown that on welfare grounds a customs union is
always Pareto-superior to an FTA. A customs union is an arrangement in which
there is zero duty between members for the imports of goods and services, and a
common external tariff. However, TACU requires considerable adjustment in
both areas:
• Will the TACU members find the political strength of a zero duty among
them? Again, this is unlikely in the near future for sectors like agriculture.
This is the same issue as with TAFTA.
• In addition, will the TACU members agree upon a common external tariff
which should be the lowest of the two former national tariffs in order not to
treat third countries worse than before? This would not be easy to achieve
because policies of North America and the EU towards third countries differ
considerably for political and historical reasons. For instance, after Turkey
has joined the EEC customs union (not the EU) will Turkey get tariff free
access to North America or will the EU have to raise barriers against Turkey
again? If the EU has to grant Mexico tariff free access thanks due to
combination of TAFTA and NAFTA, why not to the other Latin American
countries?
IV. Alternatives to TAFTA on the Multilateral Level
It has been shown that the implementation of TAFTA would face a number of
problems due to the internal and external dimension of a free trade area. Yet,
this does not imply to forego the impetus of liberalisation on which TAFTA
would be based. The benefits of liberalisation can also be reaped through the
multilateral process.16
a. ;.The conventional way
The EU and the USA should push the World Trade Organisation to pick up the
work left by the Uruguay Round. In the areas of textiles, steel and agriculture
protection has remained high. ;Following the pattern of the preceding GATT
rounds,: all member countries of the WTO should continue the common step-
wise liberalisation. As reflected ,in the Uruguay Round, this procedure is also
capable in dealing with new issues as trade in services or intellectual property
rights. ' '
 !
The first WTO Ministerial meeting will take place in Singapore in late 1996 and
would provide an excellent opportunity to launch a speeding up of multilateral
liberalisation.-Schott calls this approach "WTO 2000" and remarks that "WTO
2000" would not only ensure the full implementation of the Uruguay Round, but
also avoid a process - implicit in a WTO-consistent TAFTA - that highlights
politically sensitive issues [Schott, 1995].
b. The fast route: A US-EU specific Trans Atlantic Liberalisation Initiative -
TALI
The EU and the US could prove their commitment to global leadership in free
trade by accelerating their implementation of the commitments of the Uruguay
Round [Langhammer, 1995]. Acceleration will yield the benefits of Uruguay
Round liberalisation more quickly and provides an excellent opportunity for
early and meaningful action by the transatlantic partners. Acceleration will
challenge and "motivate other countries to do likewise and thereby encourage
world wide
: liberalisation. This idea of accelerating the implementation of the
Uruguay Round is not new. It has also been proposed by a Group of Eminent
Persons with respect to joint liberalisation initiatives of APEC members [APEC,
1995]. The "Transatlantic Agenda for Growth" proposed by the US Secretary of
State and his German counterpart points into the same direction.
Acting as a regional "turbo" to accelerate the implementation of the Uruguay
Round could take two forms. The TALI members could sign a uniform
agreement to bring forward the final date when their commitments have to be in
place. Alternatively, the TALI members could draw up a list of acceptable
options dealing with most - or even better with all - of the agreed upon Uruguay
Round commitments. The countries could choose from the list. Given the
political constraints in both regions, the later "menue" form of accelerating
certain aspects the Uruguay Round commitments seems to be more feasible.17
Bringing the final date forward would be better, but requires considerable
political will.
c. Moving towards a semi-internal market • '••••'•
 ::
The Trans Atlantic Liberalisation Initiative should also relate to issues not
agreed upon in the WTO and could thereby become the motivating force for
multilateral liberalisation in new areas. The EU and the US should decide to
establish a common institutional framework in important areas. Such framework
should be based on principles which enhance competition and enlarge the scope
of options open to choice for sellers and buyers. This would lead to the abolition
of trade and investment flows obstacles arising from the institutional setting like
binding national standards, performance requirements, licensing etc. For
instance, the EU and the US should agree upon the principle of mutual
recognition of national rules wherever possible, the application of common
merger-and-acquisition rules and on the opening up of public procurement and
financial services. Thereby the EU and the US would create important
prerequisites for a semi-internal or quasi-internal market applying home country
rules and thus promoting institutional competition.
All these elements could be part of TALI and at the same within the MFN
clause. This process of the Trans Atlantic Liberalisation Initiative would have
several advantages: First and foremost, TALI is within the WTO rules and
would be a big boost for a continuing multilateral liberalisation process. TALI
would set a counter precedent to the growing regionalism. Furthermore, TALI is
more realistic concerning the political possibilities of abolishing all
protectionism in sensitive sectors like agriculture than TAFTA. Therefore, TALI
would also be more credible. TALI could deal with the outstanding issues of the
bilateral trading relationship of the EU and the US with a very beneficial effect
for the multilateral trading order.
Other economists call a similar approach WTO-Plus. The common denominator
of these proposals are the multilateral, fast implementation of the Uruguay
Round commitments and the dismissal of the idea of exclusive preferential
treatment as it was used before in the traditional free trade arrangements.18
V; Conclusion
Raising the prospect of TAFTA signals the willingness of the US and the EU to
further liberalisation. As seen, TAFTA promises considerable benefits, but
includes considerable risks for third countries. However, the transatlantic
partners do not have to forego the potential benefits of TAFTA if they are
prepared to share these benefits with other countries.
The conclusion is straight, forward: It is better to push for freer trade through
multilateral agreements than through bilateral agreements. The effects of
multilateral commitments could be supplemented in areas in which a formal
multilateral round is unlikely to make quick advances. A transatlantic agreement
could be useful if it . ,
• opens up at least in the US and the EU public procurement, financial
services;
• results in common merger-and-acquisition rules;
• reduces the protectionist use of national standards;
• introduces the principle of mutual recognition of national rules and standards.
If the EU and the US feel the need for a transatlantic economic agreement to
boost their special relationship, they should agree on the acceleration of their
Uruguay Round commitments and the opening up of sectors not satisfactorily
covered by the WTO.19
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